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SEVERANCE OF BUYER'S DEFENSES AGAINST SELLER'S
ASSIGNEE THROUGH MERGER-DISCLAIMER
CLAUSES: CIRCUMVENTION OF UCCC
SECTIONS 2.403 AND 2.404
ROBERT DUGANJ"
I. INTRODUCTION
UNTIL RECENTLY, the buyer of goods (B) was generally unable
to invoke the seller's (S) breach against the third party who
financed B's purchase (F). This result was usually accomplished in
one of two ways: (1) by structuring the financing transaction as a
loan agreement, with F remaining outside the sales relationship; oi
(2) by using dealer financing, whereby F purchased S's rights under
the sales contract, yet avoided his duties thereunder by utilizing a
waiver-of-defense clause or the holder-in-due-course doctrine. In the
former arrangement, B paid S cash for the goods out of the loan
proceeds. Since the loan was a transaction entirely separate from
the sale, B could not refuse repayment on the ground that S had
breached his obligations.' Although this generally provided F with
t Associate Professor of Law, Indianapolis Law School. B.A., Stanford, 1963,
M.A., 1964; J.D., University of Chicago, 1967, M.C.L., 1969. The author gratefully
acknowledges the financial assistance of the Humboldt Stiftung in the preparation
of this article.
1. The buyer-borrower can successfully resist repayment of the loan only in the
unlikely event that the lender acted as seller's principal or co-venturer, that fraud
infected the loan contract, or that the lender was negligent (e.g., by providing an
innocent buyer with a loan in full knowledge that the seller was wholly unscrupulous).
Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1423-32
(1972).
Massachusetts appears to be the only state in which the lender's liability to
underlying claims and defenses is regulated by statute:
A creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of the defenses of
the borrower arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of
the loan are used, if the creditor knowingly participated in or was directly con-
nected with the consumer sale or lease transaction.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12F (1974). This section then proceeds to specify
a number of situations in which the lender is deemed to have participated in the sale
(e.g., where he is related to the seller, furnishes forms to the seller, is recommended
to the buyer by the seller and makes two loans in one year whose proceeds go to the
same seller, or is the issuer of a credit card). California has regulated the legal
significance of underlying defenses in tripartite credit card sales, probably the most
common form of direct financing. The credit card issuer is subject to the buyer's
defenses against the seller if: (1) the goods costs more than $50; (2) the sale is
within the state; (3) the buyer unsuccessfully seeks satisfaction from the seller; and(4) the buyer gives notice of a defense to the issuer. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1747.90(a)(West Supp. 1974). The Fair Credit Billing Act, passed by the Senate as S. 2101,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), provided similar protection for credit card holders. The
Federal Trade Commission has proposed a regulation which would subject both the
credit card issuer and the related lender (e.g., one who supplies forms to the seller
or to whom the seller regularly refers his buyers) to defenses arising out of the
(555)
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absolute immunity against defenses arising out of the underlying sale,
it suffered certain drawbacks. First, F's lack of communication with
prospective buyers and the high cost of assessing an individual bor-
underlying sale. 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973) (reprinted at 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE, FEDERAL LAws-REGULATIONS fJII 10,181-84 (1971)).
Buyers' defenses against related lenders and credit card issuers are regulated
by the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Tent. Final Draft, Working Redraft No.
5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as UCCC Working Redraft No. 5] and the National Con-
sumer Act (First Final Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NCA]. UCCC Working
Redraft No. 5 § 3.403(3) adopts the aforementioned California approach to buyers'
defenses in credit card purchases. Section 3.405 subjects a lender to a buyer's under-
lying defenses in six cases: where 1) the lender knows the seller received a com-
mission for arranging the loan; 2) the seller is related to the lender; 3) the seller
bears the risk of default under the loan; 4) the lender supplies documents; 5) the
loan is conditioned upon the buyer's purchase from a particular seller; or 6) the
lender has knowledge or notice of the seller's misfeasance under similar sales con-
tracts. NCA § 2.407 provides comparatively greater protection for the consumer. It
expands the category of lenders who participate in or are connected with a consumer
sale to include credit card issuers, any lender who finances 20 or more transactions
with a particular seller, a lender to whom the buyer is referred by seller (no require-
ment for compensation), and any lender who makes payment directly to the seller.
Moreover, unlike the UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 and California approach, there
are no dollar limitations or requirements that the consumer first seek satisfaction
from the seller. See Comment, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
and the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 899 (1971). See generally
Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
27 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1974); Comment, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit
Card Transactions, 81 YALE L.J. 287 (1971).
Where the loan proceeds are contained in a cashier's check payable to the
seller or to the buyer and seller jointly, the buyer may be able to prevent payment
by the lender/issuing bank. Since the cashier's check is generally viewed as a draft
accepted in advance, this cannot be effectuated by means of a stop payment order.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] §§ 4-403(1), 4-303(1),
3-410, 3-413(1). See Pennsylvania v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 427 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank and Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1974).
See generally Note, The Rights of a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 260, 261-62 (1967). However, this rule can be circumvented.
If the issuing bank is willing to cooperate with the buyer, the buyer can assign all
his rights under the sales contract to the bank. Upon the bank's refusal to pay the
cashier's check, the seller must sue. Once the seller establishes his prima facie right
to recover from the bank on the instrument, the bank will raise the defenses (non-
performance, breach of warranty) arising out of the sales contract and force the
seller to qualify as a holder in due course. UCC §§ 3-302, 3-307(3). The seller
cannot so qualify because he had notice of the defect in the goods or gave value only
"to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed." UCC § 3-303(a).
As one not a holder in due course, the seller is subject to "all defenses of any party
(the Bank) which would be available in an action on a simple contract." UCC
§ 3-306(a). An obligor on a contract (here, the bank by its obligation to the seller
on the check) can set-off against the obligee (the Seller) claims against the obligee
even though these claims are acquired through assignment, arise out of a separate
transaction, and antedate the primary obligation. See, e.g., Commerce Mfg. Co. v.
Blue Jeans Corp., 146 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Wood v. Sutton, 177 Okla. 631,
61 P.2d 700 (1936). If the check was made to the joint order of buyer and seller, the
buyer is a "party" on the instrument. Under UCC § 3-306(b), the bank can raise the
defense of "any party," hence apparently obviating the need for an assignment. Where
the bank is unwilling to cooperate, the buyer must establish a "claim" to the check
so as to come within the ambit of sections 3-306(a) and 3-603(l). He should
immediately "reject" the goods and "cancel" the sales contract. UCC §§ 2-601,
2-711(1). Having done so, he is entitled to a return of the price payment. UCC §
2-711. Since this right to the price, although secured under UCC § 2-711(3), is
contractual in nature, it may not create the requisite property interest in the check
implied by the "claim" element of UCC § 3-306(a). However, it should be noted
that Comment 5 to UCC § 3-306 states that "claim" includes all claims for rescission.
The requisite property interest also may be found in the uncodified law governing
restitution, rescission, and constructive trusts. Compare RESTATEMENT OF REsTrru-
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rower's credit-worthiness seriously limited the volume of such loan
transactions.2 Second, the arrangement also limited F's profits, since
the returns constituted "interest" subject to traditionally low rate-
ceilings' as well as to restrictions extrinsic to the particular loan trans-
action.4 This inflexibility of interest rates prevented F from pricing
his finance services in response to competitive forces or to the risks
involved in a particular transaction or group of transactions.
The disadvantages of loan financing, however, could be avoided
or minimized by dealer financing.5 Instead of obtaining a loan through
F and paying cash for the goods, B obtained an extension of credit
from S under an installment contract. In exchange for immediate
possession of the goods, B agreed to make periodic payments of the
TION § 167 (1937) (transfer induced by fraud results in constructive trust on property
received by transferee), with RESTATEMENT OP CONTRACTS § 354 (1932) (total breach
of contract involving unique res gives rise to right to specific restitution). See also
5 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 468 (3d ed. 1967). Finally, it should be noted that, upon can-
cellation, title to the goods revests in the seller. UCC § 2-401(4). It is arguable
that, by analogy, title to specific identifiable property (the check) received by the
seller should revert to the buyer. Under UCC § 3-603(1), the buyer can utilize his
"claim" to prevent the bank from paying the cashier's check. This tactic has been
successfully employed by a remitter of a bank draft. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco
Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973) and authorities cited therein.
2. Branch banking, preauthorized credit in the form of bank credit cards issued
en masse, and "no-bounce" checking accounts are familiar devices used to minimize
the contact and communication costs necessary for direct extensions of credit.
3. The traditional usury rates vary from 4% to 8% per annum with 6% being
the most common limit. See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, CHARTS 1 510 (1971).
Small-loan acts, although they permit significantly higher rates, apply only to rela-
tively small extensions of credit. Id. f 540 (1971). Installment-loan acts frequently
specify no ceiling upon the credit extension and typically permit a finance charge of
6% on the total amount until payment of the final installment. Id. 570. Where the
loan is repaid in equal monthly installments, this is equivalent to an annual percentage
rate of about 11%. See rate table to Regulation Z in 5B F. HART & W. WILLIER,
BENDERS UCC SERVICE § 9-210.408 (1973).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as UCCCI provides
for uniformly higher rates of interest for both loans and credit sales. In general,
the seller or supervised lender may charge either 1) 36% per annum on the unpaid
balances of the first $300 financed, 21% on the next $700, and 15% on the amount
greater than $1000 or 2) 18% on the entire amount financed. UCCC §§ 2.401, 3.508.
Non-supervised lenders may charge no more than 18%. UCCC § 3.201. The UCCC
rate structure is discussed in Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
68 COLUm. L. REV. 388, 394-408 (1968). Like the UCCC, the NCA provides for
either flat or graduated finance charges; however, it makes no recommendation as to
the proper rate ceiling and, for purposes of rate regulation and disclosure, does not
distinguish between a consumer credit sale and a consumer loan. See NCA §§ 2.201,
2.301, 1.301(10), and Comments thereto. The pros and cons of the UCCC and NCA
regulations are ably discussed in Comment, An Analysis of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 889,
895-90 (1971).
4. Since the interest rate is a function of the supply of loanable funds, it will be
influenced by the rates charged by the Federal Reserve Bank for discount of the lender
bank's commercial paper and for loans made to member banks, as well as by the
statutory reserve requirements. See Federal Reserve Act §§ 13, 13a, 12 U.S.C. §§ 343,
347 (1970). Interest and discount rates are fixed by Regulation A, 12 C.F.R. 201.51
(1974) ; reserve requirements are implemented by Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. 204.5 (1974).
5. For a discussion of dealer financing under the UCC, see Kripke & Felsen-
feld, Secured Transactions: A Practical Guide to Article 9 of the UCC, 17 RUTGERS
L. REv. 168, 170-81 (1962), reprinted in 2 UCC REP. SERv. 288, 291-97 (1966).
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"time-price" (.the regular cash price plus a premium for the privilege
of paying overtime) and to allow the retention of title by S until pay-
ment was completed. The retention of title by S secured his price
claim against B.6 F financed the sale transaction by purchasing the
contract from S. The time-price differential on such contracts was gen-
erally not considered "interest" under typical usury laws.7 The volume
of F's dealer-financing operations depended upon F's rapport with the
sellers - a smaller, better defined and hence more accessible class than
that of prospective buyers. Moreover, by splitting the time-price dif-
ferential with S and/or by varying its recourse against S, F was better
able to adjust the price of its services to meet competition and to reflect
the risk involved in various types of sales.' As assignee of the sales
contract, F was, of course, exposed to all B's defenses and claims against
S.' However, he was able ,to step out of S's shoes and immunize him-
self from defects in the sale transaction by resort to waiver-of-defense
clauses and/or the holder-in-due-course doctrine. 10 Unless B could
show that there existed a very "close connection" between S and F or
that F purchased the paper in bad faith or with notice of the defects,"
B had no choice but to pay F and seek recourse against S who often
proved financially irresponsible.
6. See UCC § 2-401 (1). The security interest, perfected without filing by virtue
of UCC § 9-302(1) (d), provides the desired protection against lien creditors, the
trustee in bankruptcy, used-goods dealers, and subsequent creditors with perfected
security interests. See UCC §§ 9-301 (1), 9-307(2), 9-312(5) (b).
7. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1077-83 (1967).
8. The discount rate depends upoi r:-I- and market conditions. On automobile
sales paper written at an 18% annual percentage rate, the discount ranges between
6% and 10%. So long as the discount rate is greater than zero and less than the
effective interest rate imposed by the time-price differential or finance charge, the
dealer and financer will be splitting the return represented by that differential. The
assignee's recourse rights against the dealer are generally governed by agreement
and range from "no recourse" to "full recourse." See Appendix II, f" 13 for an
example of a typical "assignment" provision found in the Retail Sales Contract.
9. See UCC § 9-318(1) (a) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 167 (1932).
10. See generally Comment, Consumer Protection - The Role of Cut-Off Devices
in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 505, 507-19 (1968). The buyer generally
signed a note payable to the sellers order, and the installment contract contained a
waiver-of-defense clause whereby buyer agreed to waive any claims or defenses which
arose out of the underlying sale and could be asserted against the assignee. If the
financer were a holder in due course on the note, he could then enforce the buyer's
price obligation free of the buyer's defenses and claims against the seller. UCC §
3-305. See, e.g., Waterbury Savings Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620,
4 UCC REP. SERV. 1049 (1967) (financer as holder in due course) ; Block v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. App. 1972) (financer as beneficiary of waiver-
of-defense clause).
11. See Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972)
(in-house financer furnished forms, investigated buyer's credit, and purchased most
of seller's contracts could not enforce waiver clause against buyer) ; General Inv.
Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971) (finance company taking home
improvement note 12 days after execution without demanding completion certificate
denied holder-in-due-course status) ; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967) (financer established to purchase seller's paper and exercise extensive control
over seller could not qualify as holder in due course or as beneficiary of waiver clause).
See also Note, Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 611 (1970).
[VOL. 19: p. 555
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Recent legislation, in particular the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (UCCC), has eliminated or greatly restricted F's immunity in the
dealer financing context.' 2 Section 2.403 of the UCCC prohibits, and
section 5.202 penalizes, the use of non-demand negotiable instruments
in consumer sales and thus effectively precludes F from exploiting the
holder-in-due-course doctrine to immunize himself from B's defenses
against S.'" Section 2.404 either forbids or sharply restricts the use
of waiver-of-defense clauses, thus leaving F qua assignee exposed to
the claims and defenses arising out of the underlying sale. 4 On the
other hand, the UCCC leaves F free to immunize himself by structur-
12. The UCCC has been adopted in Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming. It is or has been under consideration in 39 other jurisdictions.
See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 4771 (1971).
Some 35 states have enacted retail-installment-sales legislation which limits the effec-
tiveness of waiver-of-defense clauses and/or the use of negotiable instruments in
consumer sales. See 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, SPECIMEN FORMS 11 12,101
(1971). For a discussion of the various statutes, see notes 36-39 infra and Comment,
Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course" in
Consuimer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 90, 104-11 (1969).
13. Section 2.403 provides in pertinent part:
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily
for an agricultural purpose, the seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instru-
ment other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A
holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that
it is issued in violation of this section.
UCCC § 2.403. Although it remains theoretically possible for an endorsee of a note
taken in violation of UCCC § 2.403 to qualify as a holder in due course, F's knowledge
of the prohibition and the origin of the note would generally prevent him from satis-
fying the "without notice" and/or "good faith" elements of holder-in-due-course
status. UCC § 3-302; UCCC § 2.403, Comment 1. For violation of UCCC § 2.403,
UCCC § 5.202(1) excuses the debtor from paying any finance charge and entitles
him to recover three times the finance charge from the violator or his assignee.
The NCA would close the narrow loophole in UCCC § 2.403. NCA § 2.405
prohibits a merchant from taking a credit instrument payable "to order" or "to
bearer" and further provides that any subsequent holder of such an instrument takes
it subject to the consumer's defenses; and NCA § 5.304 allows the consumer to
recover the greater of $300 or 30% of the transaction total as liquidated actual and
punitive damages for violation. The UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 partially closes
the loophole in UCCC § 2.403 in two steps: 1) section 3.307 unqualifiedly prohibits
a creditor from taking a negotiable instrument other than a check dated not later
than 10 days after its issuance; and 2) section 3.404(1) provides that the seller's
assignee shall be subject to the buyer's defenses notwithstanding the fact that he is
a holder in due course of an instrument prohibited by section 3.307. The innocent
transferee for value of a prohibited instrument is apparently not subject to the
buyer's defenses unless the instrument is accompanied by an assignment of the under-
lying contract rights. His rights against the buyer would presumably depend upon
the construction of UCC § 3-305(2) (b) (illegality as a "real" defense). For a dis-
cussion of the various legislative responses to the use of negotiable instruments in
consumer transactions, see note 36 infra.
14. See notes 39 & 40 infra. UCCC § 2.404(Alt A) renders a waiver-of-defense
clause wholly ineffective; under § 2.404(Alt. B) the clause is effective to cut off only
those defenses which the buyer fails to raise within 90 days of receiving notice of
the assignment. UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 § 3.404 drops Alternative B but
requires the buyer, as a condition to invoking the defenses against the assignee, to
first make "a good faith attempt to obtain satisfaction from the seller." NCA §
2.406 subjects the assignee to all claims and defenses of the buyer, without qualifica-
tion or condition. A further potential difference between the UCCC redraft and the
NCA involves the liability of the assignee to return payments made under an assigned
contract subject to a valid defense. See note 75 infra.
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ing the finance transaction as a loan ;15 moreover, it raises and equalizes
the permissible rates on consumer loans and financed sales.'" How-
ever, except for credit card financing,' 7 which is available only to
better credit risks and subject to lower interest rates, the widespread
use of loan financing remains impeded by the expense of establishing
communications with prospective buyers, by the relative inflexibility
of interest rates, and by the difficulty of splitting the finance profits
with the supplier of the goods.
Given the natural desire of third-party financers to avoid any lia-
bility arising from the buyer-seller relationship and considering the
basic economic advantages of dealer financing over the independent
loan arrangement, it is not surprising that, despite the recent restric-
tions upon the use of negotiable instruments and waiver clauses, banks
continue to print installment contracts, distribute them to dealers, pur-
chase them when completed, and share the profits with the seller. More
interesting are the innovations employed by the banks to immunize
themselves from the seller's misfeasance. This article examines what
appear to be the most common devices used to circumvent the UCCC
restrictions upon negotiable instruments and waiver-of-defense clauses.'"
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL TRANSACTION, BASIC WRITINGS,
AND RESULTING LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
In the market for a new car (boat, large appliance, etc.), B
approaches S, who extolls his goods with the usual combination of
sales talk, earnest representations, and references to the warranties
given by the seller or manufacturer. After more or less protracted
negotiations, B agrees to purchase (and S agrees to sell) a particular
15. See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the
New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272, 276-77 (1969). For existing and proposed legis-
lation designed to plug this loophole, see note I supra. The most recent empirical
study indicates that legislation similar to sections 2.403 and 2.404 has deterred some
lenders (especially small finance companies) from buying installment contracts and
has resulted in an increased use of direct loans. See Comment, Abolishing Holder in
Due Course in Oregon Consumer Transactions: Legal and Economic Consequences,
52 ORE. L. REV. 461, 479-80 (1973).
16. See note 3 supra.
17. In credit card financing, the agreement between the issuing bank and the card-
holder seeks to establish a loan-like relationship rather than to nominate the bank
as assignee of seller's price claim against the buyer. See Brandel & Leonard, Bank
Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 1033, 1045-47 (1971).
This relationship is confirmed by UCCC § 1.301(9) (definition of "lender credit
card"). In contrast, the agreement between the bank and the participating merchant
clearly resembles an assignment. Id. at 1041-44. See also Bank Americard Member
Agreement and Bank Americard Cardholder Agreement (copies on file at the
Villanova Law Review).
18. This article does not deal with the use of direct-loan financing to cut off
buyer's defenses. For discussions of this loophole, see Miller, An Alternative Response
to the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 433-37
(1971) ; Littlefield, supra note 15, at 292-97; and Comment, Preserving Consumer
Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, supra note 1.
[VOL. 19 : p. 555
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car. It is important to note that, at this point, there probably exists
a valid contract between the parties. 9 The paper work which follows
this oral agreement generally involves two or three writings. In most
new car sales, the buyer first signs a "Sales Order." This writing
(typical provisions of which are reprinted in Appendix I) sets forth
-the basic terms of the sale20 and conditions its execution upon "pur-
chaser's ability to obtain satisfactory financing.' 2 1 After B informs S
of his preference regarding available financers (credit union, bank,
independent finance company, or manufacturer's affiliated finance com-
pany), S contacts the designated institution (F) and inquires of F's
readiness to purchase a contract signed by B.
Upon approval of his credit, B signs a "Retail Sales Contract"
form (typical provisions of which are reprinted in Appendix II) sup-
plied by F, an application for a motor vehicle certificate of title, and/or
a UCC Financing Statement. 22 Shortly thereafter, he receives posses-
sion of the vehicle and the operation manual. This manual contains
the manufacturer's warranty, pursuant to which the manufacturer
guarantees parts and workmanship against defects for a specific period
of time or usage, provides for repair and replacement by an authorized
dealer as the remedy for nonconformity, and may disclaim all other
implied and express warranties.21 Within a few days, B receives from
F both notification that it has acquired the contract and a book of pay-
ment coupons which designate the amount and date of each installment.
19. The UCC requires no magic words for contract formation:
A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of such a contract.
UCC § 2-204(1). The fact that the seller and buyer then proceed to execute a writing(purchase order) which imposes duties on both parties indicates that the oral negotia-
tions terminated in a contract. Nor will that contract fail for indefiniteness due to
open terms. UCC § 2-204(3). See, e.g., Southwest Engineering Co., Inc. v. Martin
Tractor Co., Inc., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18 (1970). However, until delivery or
partial payment, the contract is unenforceable without "some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract of sale has been made." UCC § 2-201(1).
20. See notes 57-66 and accompanying text infra.
21. Appendix I, 2 (Sales Order).
22. See UCC § 9-402. The last two items are required for compliance with thejurisdiction's motor vehicle registration act and/or for perfection of the seller's security
interest which is created through the title-retention clause of the installment contract.
UCC §§ 1-201(37), 2-401(1), 9-302(1); UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE
TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT §§ 20, 21.
23. Whereas the manufacturer's express warranty is always contained in the
operator's manual or in a separate brochure delivered with the manual, the warranty
disclaimer frequently appears only in the installment contract or, when the buyer
pays cash, in the purchase order. This arrangement recognizes 1) that in the absence
of a sales contract between manufacturer and buyer, the privity rule suffices to pre-
clude the existence of implied warranties against the manufacturer and 2) that since
the implied warranty deemed to be given by the manufacturer cannot be disclaimed
by a writing delivered after the sale is executed, the disclaimer would be ineffective
were it contained in the operator's manual alone. See Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 8 UCC REP. SERv. 688 (1970). See Appendix 1II for
typical provisions found in a New Vehicle Warranty; and Appendix I, g 12 (Sales
Order), and Appendix II, 1f 5 (Retail Sales Contract), for typical disclaimer clauses.
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Now assume that the car turns out to be a "lemon" incapable of
repair; or that S is unwilling to adequately service substantial defects
in the vehicle. B wants to revoke his acceptance, return the car, recover
at least a part of his payments, and be freed from any further obliga-
tion to F.2' To his horror, he discovers that the various writings
contain certain clauses, the combination of which operates, UCCC
or similar legislation notwithstanding, to immunize F from his defenses
and claims arising out of the underlying sale.
Ostensibly, the most important writing is the "Retail Sales Con-
tract." This contract is executed on a form which is supplied by F
and which designates F as the eventual assignee and party to whom B
shall make payments. In almost all circumstances, it operates as a con-
tract of adhesion, the terms of which are dictated by F. As a legal
document, the form serves the dual purpose of integrating the sales
contract and setting forth the security agreement between B and S.
As a security agreement, the form contains no surprises. A title reser-
vation clause 'is combined with fine-print boilerplate which governs
the care of the collateral and defines "default."" In contrast, as an in-
tegration of the sales agreement, the form supplied by F is a study in
one-sidedness. First, the only express undertakings are those made by
the buyer, for example, to purchase, to pay, and to waive defenses
against the assignee. 26 The seller does not even expressly agree to sell
and deliver the goods.2 Indeed, some such forms do not even pro-
vide a space for the seller's signature, except in connection with the
assignment clauses on the reverse side.2s Second, the contract com-
pletely disclaims all warranties.2" Comparable forms used by a manu-
24. Where the vehicle's defects cannot be remedied or the seller has failed to
properly service the vehicle, this relief is available under UCC § 2-711(1) in connec-
tion with § 2-608. See Tiger Motors Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224
So. 2d 638 (1969); Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC REP. SERv. 527 (Ind.
Super. Ct. 1972) ; Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195(L. Div. 1968). The difficulties in effectuating a justifiable revocation of acceptance
are discussed by Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE
L.J. 199, 206-16 (1963) and Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer
Buyer, 75 CoM. L.J. 354 (1970).
25. See Appendix II (Retail Sales Contract), 1 3 (title retention clause); 1(description of the collateral) ; J J 9-2---9-7 (care and custody of collateral); and1 9-9 (default). The requirements for an enforceable security interest are set forth
in UCC § 9-203()(b) (1966 version) in connection with § 9-105(1)(h) (1966
version) and § 1-201(37).
26. See Appendix II, 1j 1, 2, 4, 9(1) (Retail Sales Contract).
27. This is the minimal obligation of a seller. UCC § 2-301. It is recognized
in most standard form contracts by the recital, "Seller sells and Buyers purchase. . .
See, e.g., 18 Am. JUR. LEGAL FORMS § 253:472 (1974).
28. See, e.g., American Fletcher National Bank and Trust Company (Indianapolis,
Indiana) Form 3303, Retail Installment Security Agreement, Automobile or Mobile
Home (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
29. See Appendix II, 1 5 (Retail Sales Contract).
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facturer's in-house finance company, while likewise disclaiming all
implied warranties, generally contain at least a cross-reference to the
new-vehicle warranty."0 Third, despite the lack of any reference to the
seller's duties under the -sale, the form is designated as the "entire
agreement between the parties." "' If effective according to its terms,
this writing will enable the assignee F to enforce his price claims against
B without regard to defects in the goods, the UCCC notwithstanding.
To resist payment under the contract, B must be able to invoke
either a contract provision or a rule of law which permits him to take
such action. The Retail Sales Contract form, however, provides B
with no assistance. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), in con-
trast, contains at least two sets of provisions which could justify B's
refusal to pay. Under section 2-711(1) of the UCC, a buyer can
withhold payment and claim damages if he effectuates a justifiable
revocation of acceptance.32 Alternatively, section 2-714(1) gives the
aggrieved buyer a claim to breach-of-warranty damages which he can,
under section 2-717, deduct from the purchase price.33 As against
a naked assignee of the contract, section 9-318 permits the buyer to
raise the revocation of acceptance as a "defense" and the breach of
warranty as a "claim" to thereby defeat, wholly or in part, the assignee's
attempt to enforce the buyer's obligation to pay the price. 4 Until
relatively recently, however, as previously noted, 5 the assignee could
obtain immunity from these defenses and claims either as a holder
30. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corporation's Installment Sale Contract
Z-109, Indiana 4-72 (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
31. Appendix II, 5 (Retail Sales Contract).
32. UCC §§ 2-711(1), 2-608. On the availability of revocation of acceptance,
see authorities cited at note 24 supra. An alternative basis for this same relief is a
rightful rejection. See UCC §§ 2-711(1), 2-601, 2-602. However, in our hypothetical,
B's use of the vehicle is inconsistent with S's ownership and thus results in an
"acceptance," which precludes a "rejection." UCC §§ 2-606(1) (c), 2-607(2). Com-
pare Woods v. Van Wallis Trailer Sales Co., 77 N.M. 121, 419 P.2d 964 (1966) and
Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782(1966) (buyer's very minimal initial use of new vehicle results in acceptance) with
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968)
(buyer's driving car 0.7 mile prior to attempted rejection is not such use as to result
in acceptance and preclude rejection).
33. UCC §§ 2-714(1), 2-717. See Butane Products Corp. v. Empire Advertising
Service, Inc., 39 Mass. App. Dec. 92, 5 UCC REP. SERv. 361 (1967); Pendarvis v.
General Motors Corp., 6 UCC REP. SERV. 457 (N.Y.S. Ct., Queens County 1969)
(buyer permitted to deduct warranty damages from price owing to assignee of auto
contract).
34. UCC § 9-318 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert
defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206 the rights
of an assignee are subject to(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor
and any defense or claim arising therefrom ....
Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 167 (1932).
35. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
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in due course of a note signed in conjunction with the sale or as a
beneficiary of a waiver-of-defense clause included in the contract.
The present hypothetical is assumed to arise in a jurisdiction
which has adopted the UCCC or similar consumer legislation."' The
UCCC not only prohibits the seller from taking a negotiable instru-
ment from a consumer buyer, but, more importantly, also provides a
penalty against any assignee who attempts to enforce such a consumer
note. 7 The penalty threat explains the absence of a note in the
hypothetical. The present installment sales contract does, however,
contain a waiver-of-defense clause. Although not prohibited or sub-
ject to penalty by the UCCC or similar legislation," such cut-off
devices are limited as to their enforceability. If UCCC section 2.404
(Alt. A) 9 has been enacted, the clause is wholly ineffective. If UCCC
36. Only 15 jurisdictions appear to have no legislation restricting the use of
consumer-sale notes (Fla., Ga., Ky., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., Pa., S.C.,
Tenn., Tex., Va., W.Va.). See 2-3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, STATE DIVISION
1 4390 (1971) for the respective state. There are five main types of restrictions on
consumer notes: 1) those which apply only to home solicitation sales or peddlers
(e.g., Ariz., Iowa, N.D., N.H.) ; 2) those which prohibit execution of negotiable in-
struments other than checks to evidence indebtedness but leave open the possibility
that an instrument issued in violation of the prohibition may be acquired by a holder
in due course (e.g., UCCC § 2.403, discussed at note 13 supra; Cal., Del., Hawaii,
Me.) ; 3) those which prohibit execution of consumer notes unless they bear a con-
spicuous indication of their origin and provide that any note so marked does not con-
stitute a "negotiable instrument" under the UCC (e.g., Mass., N.J., Ore., R.I.);
4) those which enable a good faith transferee of a consumer-sale note to cut off
buyer's defenses only if buyer fails to raise his claims within a specified period (e.g.,
UCCC § 2.404(1), La., N.C., Ohio, S.D.); and 5) those which provide that any
transferee of a consumer-sale note shall be subject to all of the buyer's underlying
claims and defenses against the seller (e.g., Wis., Vt.). For a comparison of the
UCCC, NCA, and UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 rules governing negotiable instru-
ments, see note 13 supra. Restrictions on the effectiveness of waiver-of-defense clauses
are discussed at note 38 infra.
37. UCCC §§ 2.403, 5.202. See note 13 supra for the text of section 2.403 and a
description of the penalty imposed by section 5.202 for its violation.
38. It appears that in some twenty jurisdictions a waiver-of-defense clause in a
consumer sales contract is void or wholly unenforceable (Ala., Alas., Cal., Colo.,
Conn., D.C., Hawaii, Idaho, Me., Mass., Md., Minn., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., Ore,
Utah, Vt., Wash.). Some fifteen other jurisdictions have enacted laws which give
effect to a waiver clause only if the assignee provides the buyer with notice of the
assignment and receives no complaints within a specified period (Ariz., Del., Ind., La.,
Md., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Pa., P.R., S.D., Tex., Wis., Wyo.). The time for
raising complaints varies from 10 days in New York to 12 months in Wisconsin. In
those jurisdictions where this type of rule is enacted through UCCC § 2.404(Alt. B)
(e.g., Ind., Okla., Wyo.) the combination of the waiver clause, plus notice to the buyer,
and the buyer's failure to complain, protects the assignee only from those defenses
which arise before the end of the specified period. The other statutes are unclear with
respect to the effect of defenses arising after expiration of the notice period. This
legislation is compiled in 2-3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, STATE DIVISION 4380
(1971) for the respective state.
39. UCCC § 2.404(Alt. A) provides:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, an assignee of the rights of the seller
or lessor is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee against the
seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwithstanding an agreement to the
contrary, but the assignee's liability under this section may not exceed the amount
owing to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted against the 10
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section 2.404(Alt. B)4 ° has been adopted, a good faith assignee for
value enjoys only a limited immunity: he must notify the buyer of
the assignment and of the buyer's right to communicate to the assignee
within three months any defenses or claims against the seller. In
the absence of a reply from the buyer, the assignee takes free of those
claims or defenses which arise "before the end of the 3-month period
after the notice was mailed.""' Hence, in our example, even if F
mails the notice and B fails to respond, F is subject to defenses and
claims arising after the expiration of this 3-month period.42 In many
cases, the seller's failure to perform his repair obligations under the
manufacturer's warranty will continue well beyond the 3-month period.
Moreover, notice of substantial complaints of a seller's failure to per-
form and to remedy default under other contracts will disqualify the
assignee from satisfying the good faith requirement and thus deprive
him of even the limited immunity available under section 2.404(Alt.
B).43 Thus, although the UCCC does not greatly diminish the prac-
assignee. Rights of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted
as a matter of defense to or set-off against a claim by the assignee.
See note 38 supra for a list of states which have enacted this or similar provisions.
The rules appearing in the UCCC, NCA, and UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 for
regulating the effectiveness of waiver-of-defense clauses are compared in note 14 supra.
40. UCCC § 2.404(1) (Alt. B) provides:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, an agreement by the buyer or lessee
not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale or
lease is enforceable only by an assignee not related to the seller or lessor who
acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith and for value, who gives
the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment as provided in this section and who,
within 3 months after the mailing of the notice of assignment, receives no written
notice of the facts giving rise to the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense. This
agreement is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which have arisen
before the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed. The notice of
assignment shall be stated in the contract, identify the contract, describe the goods
or services, state the names of the seller or lessor and buyer or lessee, the name
and address of the assignee, the amount payable by the buyer or lessee and the
number, amounts and due dates of the installments, and contain a conspicuous
notice to the buyer or lessee that he has 3 months within which to notify the
assignee in writing of any complaints, claims or defenses he may have against
the seller or lessor and that if written notification of the complaints, claims or
defenses is not received by the assignee within the 3-month period, the assignee
will have the right to enforce the contract free of any claims or defenses the
buyer or lessee may have against the seller or lessor which have arisen before
the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. UCCC § 2.404(Alt. B), Comment. See note 38 supra for a list of states which
have enacted UCCC § 2.404(Alt. B) or similar provisions.
43. UCCC § 2.404(2) (Alt. B) provides:
An assignee does not acquire a buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith within
the meaning of subsection (1) if the assignee has knowledge or, from his course
of dealing with the seller or lessor or his records, notice of substantial complaints
by other buyers or lessees of the seller's or lessor's failure or refusal to perform
his contracts with them and of the seller's or lessor's failure to remedy his defaults
within a reasonable time after the assignee notifies him of the complaints.
Similar qualifications of the good faith requirement appear in non-UCCC statutes
restricting the operation of waiver clauses. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 517
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 422.407(3) (1974).
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tical ad terrorem effect of waiver-of-defense clauses, it so undermines
their legal operation that they no longer provide the assignee with re-
liable immunity against B's defenses arising out of the underlying sale.
There is, however, more than one way to skin a consumer. Where
the law renders unenforceable a waiver of existing defenses or pro-
scribes its severance by resort to the holder-in-due-course doctrine,
the obvious alternative route to immunity is to negate ab initio the
very existence of any legal claims or defenses. Either a justifiable
revocation of acceptance or breach of warranty presupposes a non-
conformity in the goods.4' Goods qualify as "conforming when they:
are in accordance with the obligations under the contract."45 Where, as
here, the written contract fails to specify quality terms, quality stand-
ards are determined by the UCC implied warranties unless effectively
disclaimed .4  In our example, although the defects in B's car would,
by assumption, constitute a breach of the UICC implied warranties,
these warranties have been disclaimed in the Retail Sales Contract. 7
The merger clause ("this contract contains the entire contract between
buyer and seller") precludes reliance upon those oral and written repre-
sentations of quality which were made by S but not integrated into
the installment contract.48  Together, the disclaimer and the merger
clauses thus ostensibly prevent B from designating the goods as "non-
conforming." Unable to establish the basic element of either justifiable
revocation of acceptance or breach of warranty, he is left without a
ground for resisting F's demands for price payments under the assigned
contract. His only recourse, if any, is against S or the manufacturer
under the warranties provided in the operator's manual, a document
supplied to B after he executes the Retail Sales Contract and thus
seemingly divorced from the B-F relationship. In fact, the disclaimer-
merger clause, if effective, provides F with even greater immunity
from claims and defenses than that available under waiver-of-defense
clauses and the holder-in-due-course doctrine. Disclaimer-merger
clauses, unlike the traditional immunity devices, can operate even where
F was closely connected with the seller and had notice of the defects.49
44. See UCC §§ 2-601, 2-608(l).
45. UCC § 2-106(2).
46. See UCC § 2-314(1) which provides in pertinent part: "Unless excluded or
modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale ...."
47. See Appendix II ff 5 (Retail Sales Contract).
48. Id. The merger language of the provision, if effective, will preclude intro-
duction of contradictory terms. See UCC § 2-202.
49. The effectiveness of merger-disclaimer clauses depends on: 1) their com-
pliance with the specific requirements in UCC §§ 2-316, 2-202; and 2) their con-
sistency with the general requirements of good faith and conscionability in UCC §§
2-103(1) (b), 2-302. None of these statutory requirements can be construed to affect
expressly the validity of the merger-disclaimer clause as between buyer and assignee
[VOL. 19 : p. 555
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III. VULNERABILITY OF THE MERGER-DISCLAIMER CLAUSE
AS AN IMMUNITY DEVICE
In considering the merger-disclaimer clause as an immunity de-
vice, -it is well to keep in mind the two distinct functions served by
this key provision of the Retail Sales Contract. The merger phrase
locks B into the terms of the Retail Sales Contract. If effective, it
will prevent him from relying upon any express representation of
quality outside the confines of the Retail Sales Contract, including, in
particular, S's assurance during negotiation and his adoption of the
manufacturer's express new-vehicle warranty. It will also foreclose
the argument that the contract between B and S came into existence
at an earlier or later point in time and was unaccompanied by any
disclaimer. Once B is locked into the Retail Sales Contract by the
merger language, the disclaimer phrase removes this contract from
the operation of the UCC implied warranties. The immunity sought
by F depends upon the validity of both clauses. If the merger clause
is unenforceable, B can introduce evidence of express warranties or
of a prior contract unaccompanied by any disclaimer of implied war-
ranties. Likewise, a valid merger clause will avail F nothing if the
warranty disclaimer is ineffective, since B would then be able to
invoke the UCC implied warranties. 5'
When tested against UCC standards, the merger-disclaimer clause
satisfies the most apparent prerequisites for validity. As a warranty
disclaimer, the clause is, by assumption, sufficiently conspicuous and
utilizes the requisite wording. 1 Viewed as a merger clause, the word-
ing sufficiently identifies the Retail Sales Contract as a "final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein" (e.g., warranty provisions) as to preclude contradiction of
those terms by parol evidence. 2 However, neither merger nor dis-
where the assignee has notice of defects or where the type of relationship between
assignor and assignee is a close one. The enforceability of the merger-disclaimer
combination is discussed in detail at notes 82-99 and accompanying text infra.
50. See UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315.
51. See UCC § 2-316. Similar disclaimers have been enforced in Bullinger v.
General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C. 1971) ; Lankford v. Rogers Ford
Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1972). Nevertheless, in consumer cases, many
courts go to considerable extremes to find such disclaimers unenforceable. See notes
104-07 and accompanying text infra. At least one jurisdiction has, by statute, declared
such disclaimers ineffective with respect to consumer goods. See MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (1974). Compare the prohibition of warranty disclaimers
in the proposed Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, S. 356, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Compare also NCA § 3.302 which prohibits a merchant from
excluding, modifying, or limiting any express or implied warranty or any remedy
provided by law.
52. UCC § 2-202. See Holton v. Bivens, 9 UCC REP. SFav. 836 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1971). The effectiveness of combined merger-disclaimer clauses in consumer
sales has been infrequently litigated. The few relevant decisions, all decided in favor
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claimer language will be effective unless, in addition to these formal
prerequisites, F can establish sufficient intent on the part of B to be
so bound by the Retail Sales Contract.53 F cannot use the Retail Sales
Contract itself to bootstrap himself around this elemental prerequisite
but must rely upon the implication of the events surrounding execution
of the Retail Sales Contract. Viewed as indicia of B's and S's intents,
these events militate against giving any legal effect to either the
merger or disclaimer aspects of the proposed immunity device.
The original agreement between B and S is effectuated on an oral
basis.54 After considerable haggling, B agrees to purchase, and S to
sell, a specific vehicle at a more or less certain price. In the negotia-
tions leading to this agreement, the quality of the merchandise receives
overt consideration. In addition to the usual sales talk, the seller often
provides the buyer with brochures which refer to the warranty cover-
ing the vehicle. To the extent that these representations and references
become a basis for B's decision to buy the car, the seller exposes him-
self to liability for breach of express warranties.55 Moreover, the oral
agreement never contains any disclaimer of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness which accompany all 'such sales contracts,
oral or written. Had F taken assignment of S's rights under the oral
agreement, his price claim would certainly be subject to B's claims
and defenses based upon the assumed nonconformity of the goods.56
Following the oral agreement, B and S completed a writing
designated, by its own terms, as a "Retail Sales Order. ' 7  In a com-
mercial context, a sales or purchase order generally describes a writing
of the buyer, are characterized by a judicial sympathy for the buyer's plight and by
the seller's lack of expertise in utilizing the cut-off device. See Performance Motors,
Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972) (where seller admitted to under-
takings in addition to those set forth in the contract, merger clause did not so com-
pletely integrate parties' agreement as to preclude parol evidence of warranty repre-
sentations) ; Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. App. 1973) (seller's
failure to fill in blanks of mobile home contract prevents him from relying upon
merger clause) ; Zwierzycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972) (since seller's repre-
sentations were inducements to enter contract and not part of contract itself, merger
clause did not operate to prevent parol proof of representations).
53. The parol evidence rule aplies to exclude contradictory terms if the parties
indeed intended the writing to be the final expression of their agreement. UCC § 2-202.
However, evidence of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the writing
should be admissible to show whether or not such intent in fact existed. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 228, comment a (1932) ; 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at
359-60 (1960, Supp. 1971) and authorities cited therein.
54. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
55. UCC § 2-313. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n,
Inc., __ Ind. App. ,_ 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) (seller of chickens bound by repre-
sentations made in course of negotiations because warranty disclaimer in delivery
receipt was not conspicuous) ; Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186
S.E.2d 162 (1972) (merger clause ineffective to bar evidence of representations made
by seller prior to execution of written sale agreement).
56. See UCC § 9-318(1) (a), the text of which is reprinted in note 34 supra.
57. Typical provisions found in a Retail Sales Order are reprinted in Appendix I.
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intended to operate either as an offer or acceptance. 8 In our hypothe-
tical, the Sales Order's description of the vehicle and its statement of
the price terms are consistent with either alternative. However, other
provisions of the Sales Order indicate that it is intended to operate as
a partial integration and elaboration of the oral agreement. First,
the Sales Order contains a clause stating that it represents the entire
agreement of the parties. 9 Second, the Sales Order incorporates the
manufacturer's "New Vehicle Warranty,"6 and also contains a con-
spicuous disclaimer of all implied warranties.6 Third, the seller
promises to service the stated warranties.6 2 Fourth, the Sales Order
provides that, should the buyer renege on the agreement, the seller
may retain any deposit and trade-in to liquidate his damages arising
from the lost sale.6" Finally, the writing is signed by both B and S.64
These characteristics indicate that the Sales Order is meant to operate
as a "contract" rather than a mere offer or acceptance. Indeed, where
the buyer pays cash for the vehicle, the Sales Order is the only writing
signed by the parties and is presumably intended to embody their
agreement. Only one clause militates against viewing the Sales Order
as a distinct and enforceable contract: the obligations of B and S are
"subject to the purchaser's ability to obtain satisfactory financing."6"
This condition refers to the approval of B's credit by the institution
which finances B's purchase. Under the better view, such approval
by a third party does not preclude recognition of a valid bilateral con-
tract prior to occurrence of the approval.6
Consider, now, the position of F if he had taken assignment of
the B-S contract represented by the Sales Order. The warranty dis-
58. A buyer's "order" constitutes an offer when it follows upon seller's quotation
of price; it can operate as acceptance when it follows seller's offer to sell at a given
price. See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Somis Corp., __ Mass. __
284 N.E.2d 880 (1972) (purchase order as acceptance) ; Certified Laboratories, Inc.
v. Foley, 52 W.L.J. 103, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 1041 (Pa. CP. 1969) (purchase order
as offer). Whether a purchase order operates as an offer or an acceptance is often
crucial in determining the contents of the final agreement under UCC § 2-207. See
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robbins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968)
(purchase order as offer; subsequent letter a counter-offer and not an acceptance).




63. Id. 9 8.
64. Id. 4.
65. Id. 111 2,14.
66. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1932). Comment a to that section
provides in pertinent part:
A promise conditional upon the promisor's satisfaction is not illusory since it means
more than that validity of the performance is to depend on the arbitrary choice
of the promisor.
See also 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 644, at 83-84 (1960) discussing and approving
Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958) (agreement for sale of shopping
center tract, which was subject to seller's obtaining leases satisfactory to purchaser,
was held not to be illusory for want of mutuality).
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claimer and merger clause, if effective, would immunize F from B's
claims based upon breach of implied warranties or express representa-
tions made by S during negotiation.67 Hence, F would be far better
off in this position than as assignee of S's rights under the preliminary
oral agreement. 68 Nevertheless, in the Sales Order, S makes two ex-
plicit undertakings which may provide B with an eventual claim or
defense against F. S adopts the manufacturer's New Vehicle Warranty
and undertakes to promptly perform its conditions.6 9 Should the
defects be irreparable or should S fail to promptly service the vehicle,
B can demand assurances of performance and suspend payments.70
Continued nonperformance by S may then be treated as a repudiation
of the contract. 7' Alternatively, the nonconformity, when coupled
with S's nonperformance of the service obligation, can be viewed as
the failure of an exclusive remedy. 72 In such a case, a buyer can resort
to the usual UCC remedies including revocation of acceptance.7 8  S's
constructive repudiation 'and B's revocation of acceptance justify non-
payment of price, a defense which may be asserted against F as assignee
since the Sales Order contract lacks a waiver-of-defense clause.74  F
might also be liable, at least in part, for the return of price payments
already received from B."5
67. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Appendix I, 13 (Sales Order).
70. UCC § 2-609(1).
71. UCC § 2-609(4).
72. UCC § 2-719(2). See, e.g., Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.
1971) ; Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
73. UCC § 2-719(2) provides: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act." See also UCC § 2-608. In addition to cases cited in note 72 supra, in which
courts have permitted damages relief upon seller's failure to perform his repair obliga-
tion, see Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250
(1972) (upon seller's failure to repair defects in new car, buyer is permitted to
revoke acceptance).
74. See UCC § 9-318(1) (a), the text of which is reprinted at note 34 supra.
75. Whether the assignee must return to the buyer payments received under a
contract subject to rescission against both seller and assignee is an issue upon which
the few extant authorities are divided. For example, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 14(2) (1936) provides:
An assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action who, having paid value therefor,
has received payment from the obligor is under no duty to make restitution although
the obligor had a defense thereto, if the transferee made no misrepresentation and
did not have notice of the defense.
Accord, Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74
YALE L.J. 217, 230 (1964). See also UCC § 9-318(1), RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 167 (1932), and UCCC § 2.404(Alt. A), which appear to permit the buyer to use
his claims and defenses only as a shield. However, the few relevant judicial decisions
may favor the opposite result. See, e.g., Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. Delozier, 178
Colo. 291, 496 P.2d 1016 (1972) (where subcontractor assigned payment rights against
contractor to finance company but failed to perform, contractor could recover pay-
ments already made to finance company) ; Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800,
94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971) (buyers permitted to rescind the contract and
recover payments made to assignee finance company). The Vasquez decision can be
reconciled partially with RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 14(2) by reference to the
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It is only after completion of the Sales Order and approval of
buyer's credit that S presents B with the "Retail Sales Contract"
which contains the crucial merger-disclaimer clause." By this time,
the average buyer would view himself as being irrevocably committed
to the deal.77 It is a commitment made in reliance upon S's under-
takings during the negotiations, first expressed in the oral agreement,
and finalized in the Sales Order contract. The Retail Sales Contract
is a title-retention sales agreement drafted by F, the institution which
agrees to finance the transaction. The form designates F as the assignee
and the party to whom B will make his payments. In contrast to the
Sales Order, this conditional sales contract contains a waiver-of-
defenses clause, imposes no explicit duties on the seller, and disclaims
all warranties .7  Like the Sales Order, the Retail Sales Contract
states that it constitutes the "entire contract. ' 79 If given effect as a
complete integration of the B-S agreement, the Retail Sales Contract
will, as discussed above," immunize F from B's claims and defenses
court's finding that the assignee had constructive knowledge of the buyers' defenses
against the seller. Id. at 824, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812, 484 P.2d at 980.
Neither UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 § 3.404(2) nor NCA § 2.406 explicitly
limits the buyer to the assertion of his rights as "a matter of defense to or set-off
against a claim by the assignee." UCCC § 2.403. Nor, however, does either explicitly
establish the assignee's liability for complete restitution. UCCC Working Redraft
No. 5 § 3.404(2) provides in pertinent part:
A claim or defense of a consumer specified in subsection (1) . . . may be as-
serted . . . only to the extent of the amount owing to the assignee with respect
to the sale . . . at the time the assignee has notice of the claim or defense.
Suppose, after the buyer has paid $1,000 of a $4,000 price debt to the assignee, he
gives notice of a defect in the goods and pays another $200 before he realizes that
he will not receive satisfaction from the seller. Assume further that the defect justifies
a revocation of acceptance and a claim to the return of the purchase price. UCCC
Working Redraft No. 5 § 3.404 will permit the buyer to refuse payment of the
remaining $2,800. It is also likely that it establishes a right to restitution of $200.
Whether it permits restitutionary recovery of the pre-notice $1,000 depends upon the
construction of the phrase, "extent of the amount owing." If the word "extent" is
viewed as the limiting factor, the provision does not preclude restitutionary recovery.
However, if "amount owing" is the limiting term, the proposed provision bars restitu-
tionary recovery of the $1,000 since it cannot be viewed as an "amount owing" to the
assignee, having already been paid. Simpler but even more ambiguous is NCA § 2.406:
Notwithstanding any term or agreement to the contrary, an assignee of the rights
of the creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer, up to the
amount of the transaction total, arising out of a consumer credit transaction.
Read literally, the reference to "all claims . . . up to the amount of the transaction
total" certainly would not preclude restitution from the assignee. The language,
however, does evidence a design to protect the assignee from liability for consequential
damages in excess of the purchase price.
76. See Appendix II, 1 5 (Retail Sales Contract).
77. The average buyer probably views himself as committed once he orally
announces to the seller, "I'll take it." Those few who still view themselves as uncom-
mitted change their attitude upon signing the Sales Order, with its provisions govern-
ing merger, liquidated damages, warranties, and disclaimers, and upon making the
required deposit. As a matter of good public relations, however, new car dealers almost
never seek to retain the deposit of or impose contract liability upon a buyer who
repudiates the agreement after signing the purchase order but before execution of the
installment contract.
78. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
79. Appendix II, 5 (Retail Sales Contract).
80. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
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arising from S's failure to perform. As assignee of the Retail Sales
Contract, F is in a better position than as assignee of S's rights under
the Sales Order contract. The latter subjected F to B's claims and
defenses arising from S's failure to remedy breaches of the New Vehicle
Warranty."' Just as the Sales Order contract utilizes merger-dis-
claimer language to truncate rights created under the oral agreement,
the Retail Sales Contract applies the same technique to sever rights
arising under the Sales Order. It remains to be seen whether and
to what extent one contract can extinguish rights and duties created
by a prior agreement between the same parties.
The Retail Sales Contract will extinguish B's rights under the
prior agreements only if it operates as a superseding agreement, as a
modification, or as a waiver . 2 In the Retail Sales Contract qua super-
seding agreement, the buyer agrees to accept a far smaller bundle of
rights than that created by the oral contract or the Sales Order con-
tract. In particular, he expressly agrees not to invoke the earlier
undertakings of S with respect to warranty and service. However,
nowhere does the installment contract provide B with additional con-
sideration for this detrimental change in position. Under a well-
recognized rule of contract law, S's promise to perform a pre-existing
duty does not constitute adequate consideration for B's forbearance."5
A fortiori, his promise to perform only a part of a pre-existing duty is
also inadequate consideration. Hence, as a superseding agreement,
the Retail Sales Contract is ineffective to extinguish the warranty
rights created by the oral agreement or the Sales Order contract.
The consideration difficulty can be circumvented, at least in part,
by viewing the Retail Sales Contract as a "modification" or "waiver."
Under section 2-209(1) of the UCC, an "agreement modifying a
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding."
However, as emphasized in the official comment to section 2-209,14
modifications lacking independent consideration must meet the objec-
tive test of good faith imposed by UCC section 2-103;85 its "fair
dealing" standard surely is controverted when a merchant employs
written undertakings in an apparent contract (the warranty and service
81. See notes 68-75 and accompanying text supra.
82. The present facts preclude extinction or transformation of B's rights through
other means of discharge such as performance or accord and satisfaction. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 385 (1932).
83. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 76, 78; § 78, illustration 1 (1932). These
provide that performance of a pre-existing duty or promise of such performance is not
adequate consideration.
84. See UCC § 2-209, Comment 2.
85. UCC § 2-103(1) (b) provides:
"Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
[VOL. 19: p. 555
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/1
MERGER-DISCLAIMER CLAUSES
obligations in the Sales Order) to entice a consumer into entering a
second contract which disclaims those same undertakings. Contract
rights obtained through this type of "bargaining naughtiness" might
reasonably be attacked as unconscionable under section 2-302 of the
UCC"6 or as voidable under the law of fraud . 7 This consideration
also militates against viewing the Retail Sales Contract as an effective
waiver of the rights created by the Sales Order contract. Otherwise,
the UCC regulates neither the formal nor substantive prerequisites
of the type of waiver arguably represented by the Retail Sales Con-
tract .8  However, according to the Restatement of Contracts (Restate-
ment), the Retail Sales Contract could not effectuate a valid waiver of
B's rights. First, a waiver which is unsupported by new and adequate
consideration is possible only with respect to conditions or terms, the
performance of which is not a material part of the agreed exchange.8 9
Certainly, warranty and service obligations regarding a new car can-
not be characterized as immaterial. Under the Restatement, perform-
ance of such material terms is excused only through a superseding
agreement.90 This is, however, precluded by the previously-noted
defect in the consideration offered by S in the Retail Sales Contract.9'
Second, it is doubtful whether the merger-disclaimer clause in the
Retail Sales Contract is a manifestation of intent sufficient to waive
the pre-existing rights against S.92 Since the Retail Sales Contract
86. UCC § 2-302. This section establishes the parameters of fairness beyond
which agreements must not go. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 116-19 (1972), where unconscionability is divided into "procedural" unconscion-
ability (bargaining "naughtiness") and "substantive" unconscionability (harsh terms).
87. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 473 (1932). Section 473 provides: "A con-
tractual promise made with the undisclosed intention of not performing it is fraud." Id.
88. See generally Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 488 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1973) (oral waiver permitted under UCC) ; Blubaugh v. Ponca City Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 42 Okla. Bar Ass'n J. 2309, 9 UCC REP. SERv. 786 (Okla. App. 1971)
(discusses many UCC decisions dealing with law of waiver applicable to severance
of farm-products security interests) ; George Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co.,
6 Wash. App. 327, 493 P.2d 782 (1972) (common law concept of waiver used to
determine if waiver had occurred). All the cases hold that the common law concept
of waiver survives under UCC § 1-103. In controversy is the extent to which that law
is modified by certain UCC sections which, however, are not even arguably applicable
to our facts. See, e.g., UCC § 1-107 (waiver of claims arising out of breach); UCC
§ 1-205(4) (express terms negate any waiver based upon course of dealing); UCC
§ 2-209(4) (modification not satisfying statute of frauds may operate as waiver).
89. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 88(1), 297 (1932).
90. Id. § 297, comment c.
91. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
92. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 297, comment c (1932):
If performance of the condition [e.g., seller's adoption of the new vehicle war-
ranty] is a material part of the agreed exchange, an agreement [e.g., the Retail
Sales Contract] to be liable in spite of the non-performance of the condition in-
volves to so great a degree a new undertaking that the requisites for the crea-
tion of a new contract must exist.
An increasing number of courts refuse to enforce boilerplate language in adhesion
contracts which limits or deprives the consumer buyer of otherwise available or pre-
existing rights, unless the seller expressly brings that language to the buyer's attention.
See Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972) ; Woodruff
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does not purport to be a waiver, to view it as such is to admit that
the writing is ambiguous on this point. This ambiguity justifies the
admission of parol evidence to show that B never intended to relin-
quish the rights created by the oral agreement or the Sales Order
contract." The lack of new consideration from S, the materiality of
the prior rights in question, and the purport of the agreement itself
coalesce to prevent the Retail Sales Contract from extinguishing or
modifying the rights afforded B under the prior agreements.
The effectiveness of the Retail Sales Contract in precluding B
from raising warranty claims and defenses can also be viewed strictly
as a parol evidence problem. The relevant parol evidence rule appears
in UCC section 2-202:
Terms ... set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms . . .may
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement ....
Hence, if the Retail Sales Contract indeed was intended as a "final
expression of agreement" with respect to the quality terms, B will be
unable to introduce evidence of the warranty representations contained
in the oral agreement and the Sales Order. Without reference to
quality standards, B cannot establish that the defects render the vehicle
"nonconforming" for purposes of Article 2's remedial provisions.
Despite the self-serving recital to the contrary - "this contract
contains the entire contract ...and no warranties, of merchantability
or otherwise, express or implied ... been made by or on behalf of the
seller, except as set forth herein . . . ."9 - the Retail Sales Contract
demonstrates, on its face, that it was not intended as the "final ex-
pression" of the parties' agreement with respect to the quality terms.
As noted above, the writing does not impose a single express obliga-
tion upon the seller. Except for its title ("Retail Sales Contract")
the writing evidences nothing more than B's promise to pay a sum
certain to S or his assignee. If this is the "entire agreement," it is
unenforceable for want of consideration to support B's promise. To
v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, Ind. App. ___ 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) ;
Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC REPI. SERV. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972) ; Dobias
v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971) ; De Coria v.
Red's Trailer Mart, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 892, 491 P.2d 241 (1971). All the foregoing
involved warranty disclaimers.
93. UCC § 2-202. The point here is not whether a particular provision of the
Retail Sales Contract (see Appendix II, ff 5) operates effectively as a merger clause
or warranty disclaimer, but whether it can operate as a waiver of pre-existing rights.
So viewed, 5 (Appendix II) definitely is ambiguous and parol evidence is admis-
sible under UCC § 2-202 to explain the significance of the clause.
94. Appendix II, 1 5 (Retail Sales Contract). It should be noted that the parole
evidence rule does not preclude evidence of subsequent agreements. Often the New
Vehicle Warranty does not enter the transaction until after the Retail Sales Contract
has been executed. It then operates as a modification of the B-S agreement. Under
UCC § 9-318(2), this modification binds the assignee.
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meet this argument, F must admit that the document does in fact
impose specific duties upon the seller, a reading which is impossible
without reference to parol evidence.95 Once the question of sufficient
consideration is opened to parol evidence, B can argue that the ex-
press warranties contained in the Sales Order contract and in the oral
agreement represented a substantial part of the consideration for his
payment obligation.
Alternatively, B can introduce evidence of the express warranty
under a well-established qualification of the parol evidence rule: the
rule does not apply to proof of such "facts rendering the agreement
void or voidable for illegality, fraud, duress, mistake or insufficiency
of consideration."96 This is but one example of the general principle
that the parol evidence rule does not extend to questions involving
inducement to sign a purported integration." Indeed, other than by
parol evidence, there is no way to establish whether a writing in fact
was intended as the "final expression of agreement." In our hypo-
thetical, this principle permits B to introduce the express warranties
given by S in the oral agreement and the Sales Order. The repre-
sentations of warranty, when coupled with B's reliance thereon and
S's knowledge that the final contract contained no such warranties,
constitute common law fraud or a statutory "deceptive act," either of
which renders the contract voidable.98 Even if S's behavior does not
constitute fraud, evidence of the representations are properly admis-
sible to show that, given such inducements, B cannot be deemed to
have intended to integrate the B-S agreement into a writing which
deprived him of the basis of his bargain. 9
In sum, when viewed against the parties' negotiations and prior
agreements, the Retail Sales Contract cannot stand as a complete in-
tegration. The integration, if there ever was one, consisted of the
95. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240(2) (1932), which provides:
Where no consideration is stated in an integration, facts showing that there was
consideration and the nature of it, even if it was a promise, or any other facts
that are sufficient to make a promise enforceable, are admissible in evidence and
are operative.
96. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 238(b) (1932). See, e.g., Fecik v. Capindale,
54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (C.P. 1971) (car buyer permitted to introduce seller's state-
ments regarding mileage).
97. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1932) and comment a to that section,
which provides: "That a document was or was not adopted as an integration may be
proved by any relevant evidence." Accord, 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at
359-60 (1960).
98. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text infra.
99. In addition to authorities cited in note 97 supra, see, e.g., Thrifty Rent-A-Car
System v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., ____ Colo. App. _, 500 P.2d 172 (1972)
(buyer of cars could introduce parol evidence of rebate agreement since it constituted
inducement for the buyer's promise) ; Zwierzycki v. Owen, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972)
(buyer of trailer home under purportedly integrated contract permitted to show seller's
oral promises regarding repair and service of home since they induced buyer's obli-
gation) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240, illustration 7 (1932).
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Sales Order contract which unambiguously granted warranty rights
to the buyer. Having enticed B into a sale agreement through war-
ranty promises, F and S cannot, at the last moment, extinguish B's
rights by having him sign a new piece of paper. The Retail Sales
Contract amounts to little more than a unilateral, post-contractual act
on the part of F and S.' Given their knowledge of the representa-
tions leading to the oral agreement and those contained in the Sales
Order, the Retail Sales Contract represents an oppressive exercise in
bad faith. Article 2 of the UCC provides no independent remedy for
such culpa in contrahendo unless it rises to the level of unconscion-
ability.' However, the attempt by S and F to deprive B of the basis
of his bargain could qualify as fraud, either under the common law
10 2
or under the deceptive-practices acts enacted in several jurisdictions.0 8
Moreover, even if the Retail Sales Contract were viewed as a
complete integration of the sales agreement, the warranty disclaimer
100. A sale is not an instantaneous phenomenon. It commences with inquiries and
invitations to offer, proceeds to offer and acceptance, then may entail an exchange of
papers, and concludes with tender and payment. The precise point at which the con-
tract comes into existence is not easy to establish. Some courts have seized upon the
point-of-contract as a policy variable. By moving this point toward the beginning of
negotiations, a court can effectively immunize a party against the legal implications
of writings delivered subsequent to that time. This same approach has been used
repeatedly by courts to protect buyers from warranty disclaimers contained in writings
delivered after a written contract has been signed. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v.
McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, ____ Ind. App -..., 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) ; Zoss v. Royal
Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC REP. SERV. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972) ; Uganski v. Little
Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580 (1971).
101. UCC § 2-302. See Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401,
402-05 (1964). The unenforceability of contracts or contract provisions which results
from application of UCC § 2-302 derives not so much from the obj ective content of
the contract or provision, as from the quality of the negotiation leading to the contract.
This is demonstrated by the courts' emphasis upon the comparative bargaining power
of the parties, their expertise, the commercial setting of the contract, duress, the failure
to disclose relevant facts, and other deceptive practices. In fact, the substantive con-
tent of a contract can seldom be attacked successfully under UCC § 2-302 in the
absence of culpa in contrahendo. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 4-6, at 125-29 (1972) (citing many cases). On the distinction between "sub-
stantive" and "procedural" unconscionability, see generally Ellinghaus, In Defense of
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 761-78 (1969).
102. See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971)
(buyer's fraud action is precluded neither by fact that seller's representations did not
qualify as express warranties under UCC § 2-313 nor by presence of warranty dis-
claimer valid under UCC § 2-316).
103. For example, where S uses warranty representations to obtain an oral com-
mitment from B, and subsequently employs a "purchase order" form containing similar
warranty references to obtain an initial written commitment and deposit from B, only
then to disclaim all warranties in a final document with which he is intimately ac-
quainted, he has committed a "deceptive act" under UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES
PRACTICES ACT § 3(b) which provides in pertinent part:
[T]he act or practice of a supplier in indicating any of the following is deceptive:
(2) that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard,
quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not . ..(10) that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights,
remedies, or obligations if the indication is false .... 22
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is vulnerable. An ever-increasing number of courts are holding that,
in consumer sales, such disclaimers are invalid unless expressly negoti-
ated or brought to the buyer's attention."° Given the content of both
the oral agreement and the Sales Order contract, either S or F would
find it difficult if not impossible to prove that the warranty disclaimer
in the Retail Sales Contract was a "dickered" term. The warranty
disclaimer may also be subject to attack under UCC section 2-719.
By completely disclaiming all warranties, the seller leaves the buyer
virtually without remedy for defects in the goods.'05 Although section
2-719 permits a limitation upon remedies - such as restricting the
buyer to seeking repair or replacement only - it requires that "mini-
mum adequate remedies be made available.""' A complete exclusion
of all remedies should require a court to strike down the limitation as
unconscionable and to apply the UCC's remedy sections.'0 7
Finally, the Retail Sales Contract violates the public policy em-
bodied in sections 2.403 and 2.404 of the UCCC. By these provisions,
the draftsmen sought to neutralize the only devices known to them to
be employed to sever the buyer's defenses against the dealer's financer.
This explicit expression of pro-buyer policy, when coupled with the
policy against complete warranty disclaimers embodied in the UCC,
should suffice as a basis for refusing to enforce the merger-disclaimer
clause insofar as it purports to deprive B of his defenses against F.
As assignee, F is so vulnerable to B's claims and defenses as to
be tempted to construe the B-F relationship as a direct loan. Both
the Retail Sales Contract and the events surrounding its execution
support this interpretation of the B-F transaction. The very charac-
teristics which militate against viewing the Retail Sales Contract as
a sales agreement l s (the requirement that B make payments to F,
the absence of any duty imposed upon S, the lack of any remedy for
nonconformity) nevertheless are compatible with the view that it is
a loan agreement. As in direct-loan financing, B chose the financial
institution who financed the sale; an investigation of the prospective
debtor's credit-worthiness preceded the extension of credit; the credit
104. See note 92 supra.
105. The complete absence of warranties precludes B from establishing the non-
conformity necessary to support a rejection, revocation of acceptance, or damages
claim. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
106. UCC § 2-719, Comment 1.
107. Id. See also UCC § 2-719(2). Upon the seller's and manufacturer's failure
to fulfill the limited remedy provided by the standard new-vehicle warranty, the buyer
may resort to the usual UCC remedies, including revocation or damages. See, e~g.,
Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973) ; Moore v. Howard
Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App. 1973); notes 72 and 73 supra.
The same relief should, a fortiori, be available to a buyer who receives no warranty
protection in connection with the purchase of a new vehicle.
108. See notes 58-66 and accompanying text supra.
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proceeds were disbursed directly to the seller ;109 the credit is liquidated
by payments directly to F; and any default by B may lead to enforce-
ment of a security interest identical to -that used to collateralize a
direct loan. In the direct-loan interpretation of the B-F relationship,
S acts as F's agent for finding a loan customer. As compensation, he
receives a share of the finance charge when F discounts the paper.
Compared to its position as an assignee, F as a direct-loan financer
enjoys far greater -immunity from B's claims and defenses against S
because its claims will be subject to defeat only in the event that it was
S's principal in the sale transaction; that fraud infected the loan con-
tract; that it as the lender was negligent; or that the jurisdiction
enacted legislation rendering the direct lender subject to claims and
defenses arising out of the underlying sale. °
Although the direct-loan ploy might provide potentially greater
immunity in an individual case, its adoption by a court could entail
devastating results in other cases. To sustain the direct-loan argu-
ment, F must recognize S as its agent for finding a loan customer.
Once S becomes F's agent, representations which normally serve as
inducements only for the sale would also constitute inducements for the
loan agreement. As S's principal, F's rights under the loan agreement
are subject to defeat on account of S's misrepresentations. Further-
more, unlike the assignee of a sales agreement, F as S's principal
becomes personally liable for S's misconduct in arranging for the loan.
In the hypothetical, for instance, S arguably perpetrates a fraud when
he employs warranty representations in the oral negotiations and
Sales Order to obtain B's commitment, only to deprive B of warranty
expectations once the commitment has been obtained."' It is to avoid
such liability for S's conduct that the Retail Sales Contract expressly
provides: "Seller is not the agent of the Bank for any purpose. '
Given this provision in F's own contract and the consequences at-
tendant upon its converse, it is extremely unlikely that F will urge
adoption of the direct-loan construction of the B-F relationship, even
though that interpretation often may better comport with the reality
of the transaction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The genesis and deployment of the merger-disclaimer clause war-
rants two concluding observations. The most obvious lesson, perhaps,
concerns the efficacy of remedial legislation. In sections 2.403 and
109. In dealer financing, the financer pays the seller directly for the chattel paper;
in loan financing, the financer also endeavors to disburse the proceeds directly to the
seller by means of a check payable to the seller's order or to the joint order of
buyer and seller.
110. See note 1 supra.
111. See notes 87 & 98 and accompanying text supra.
112. Appendix II, 2 (Retail Sales Contract).
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2.404 of the UCCC, the draftsmen sought to restore the legitimacy
of justifiable nonpayment, the buyer's most effective means to ensure
the seller's performance. The meteoric rise of direct-loan financing,
in the form of bank credit cards, illustrates the most obvious loophole.
The social significance of this gap is tempered by the fact that those
who qualify for a bank credit card can perhaps better fend for them-
selves than the typical signatory of a consumer note. With respect to
indirect financing, UCCC sections 2.403 and 2.404 have led to a more
pernicious result, one which the draftsmen most certainly did not,
and perhaps could not, have foreseen. Waiver-of-defense clauses and
consumer notes have been replaced by merger-disclaimer clauses which,
if effective, leave the buyer with far less recourse than did traditional
immunity devices. A negotiable instrument or waiver-of-defense clause,
while providing immunity for the financer, nonetheless did not foreclose
the buyer's legal remedies against the seller. Moreover, their im-
munizing effect could be neutralized by the buyer's showing that the
financer had notice of the underlying defects or was closely connected
with the seller's operation. In contrast, the merger-disclaimer device
operates directly on the buyer-seller relationship in such a way as to
preclude relief against the seller, too, and does so independently of the
notions of notice or involvement.
Analysis of the merger-disclaimer immunity device discloses, as
a second lesson, the continued relevance of elementary contract doc-
trines and their interrelationship with the modern commercial law
of the UCC. Traditional immunity devices were tested primarily by
reference to concepts contained in the codified commercial law, i.e.,
notice, good faith, and the "connected lender" concept. In contrast, as
demonstrated in the foregoing discussion, the effectiveness of the
merger-disclaimer device depends primarily upon the operation of such
basic contract law doctrines as consideration, waiver, modification,
and the parol evidence rule. Although the analysis of the merger-
disclaimer clause appears rather technical, it represents more than a
juggling exercise to accomplish preconceived policy objectives. The
basic contract doctrines invoked were developed to prevent the very
type of overreaching represented by the Retail Sales Contract.
In the indirect financing of new cars, the author and beneficiary
of the Retail Sales Contract does not enter the picture until negotia-
tions are virtually completed, but then ruthlessly exploits the vulner-
ability of the buyer. The financer generally knows the nature of the
representations which induce the buyer to commit himself in the oral
agreement, as well as the nature of the express warranties given by
the seller and manufacturer under the standard new-vehicle warranty.
MARCH 1974]
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The financer is also aware that the buyer - having orally committed
himself, having signed an apparent contract (Sales Order), having
arranged for financing, having made a deposit, and now having had
the car within his grasp - will not balk at signing just one more piece
of paper. Not even the seller considers the Retail Sales Contract as
the document which defines his duties with respect to the buyer: the
seller intends to perform the terms of the Sales Order contract with its
warranties and service obligations running in favor of the buyer. The
doctrines governing consideration, waiver, modification, and parol
evidence find their justification in their ability to prevent one party
from being deprived of existing rights in the absence of sufficient
certainty as to the requisite intent. If ever applicable, these rules
should operate where a financer enters a virtually completed sale and
seeks, unilaterally, -to condition final performance upon the buyer's
relinquishing the major part of his bargain.
26
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APPENDIX I
A typical sales order used in the purchase of a motor vehicle
would include the following provisions:
SALES ORDER
(Front)
(1) Purchaser Understands That the Motor Vehicle He Is Purchasing Is Warranted
or Not Warranted As Indicated Below:
[o Manufacturer's Standard New Vehicle Warranty As Stated By The Manu-
facturer And Limited By Section 12 On The Reverse Side Of This Retail
Order Form.
Signed:
EO No Warranty Is Given On The Above Described Vehicle, Either Expressed
Or Implied, Of Merchantibility, Or Of Fitness, And The Vehicle Is Sold In
Its Present Condition As Is.
Signed:
o Used Car Warranty Furnished By The Dealer And Subject To The Terms
And Conditions As Set Forth in Paragraph 16 On The Reverse Side of
This Retail Sales Order Form.
Signed:
O The Remainder Of The Manufacturer's Standard New Vehicle Warranty, If
Available. Seller does not certify whether or not, nor the extent to which the
remainder of the manufacturer's standard new vehicle warranty exists. Pur-
chaser Understands It Is His Responsibility To Purchase And/Or Transfer
The Remainder Of This Warranty Into His Name.
Signed:
(2) Unless The Purchaser Is Paying Cash, The Purchaser's and Dealer's Obliga-
tions Under This Sales Order Are Subject To The Purchaser's Ability To Obtain
Satisfactory Financing.
(3) Purchaser has read the front and back of this sales order and understands that it
represents the entire agreement affecting this purchase. No other representations,
agreements or warranties have been made and no services are to be rendered or
items furnished unless written or printed herein.
(4) Purchaser certifies that he is 21 years of age, or older, and hereby acknowledges
receipt of a copy of this order. Purchaser understands that all items or services
promised to him have been written in on the above retail sales order and that
no verbal agreements are binding or will be honored.
(5) This Order Is Not Valid Unless Signed And Accepted By Dealer Or His
Authorized Representative.
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(Reverse)
CONDITIONS
It is further understood and agreed: The order on the reverse side hereof is subject
to the following terms and conditions which have been mutually agreed upon.
(6) The manufacturer has reserved the right to change the list price of new motor
vehicles without notice and in the event that the list price of the new car ordered
hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which is based on list price
effective on the day of delivery, will govern in this transaction. But if such cash
delivered price is increased the purchaser may, if dissatisfied with such increased
price, cancel this order, in which event, if a used car has been traded in as a part
of the consideration herein, such used car shall be returned to the purchaser
upon the payment of a reasonable charge for storage and repairs (if any) or, if
the used car has been previously sold by the dealer, the amount received therefor,
less a selling commission of 15% and any expense incurred in storing, insuring,
conditioning, or advertising said car for sale, shall be returned to the purchaser.
(7) If the used car is not to be delivered to the dealer until the delivery of the new car,
the used car shall be reappraised at that time and such reappraisal value shall
determine the allowance made for such used car. The purchaser agrees to deliver
the original bill of sale and the title to any used car traded herein along with the
delivery of such car, and the purchaser warrants such used car to be his property
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except as otherwise noted herein.
(8) Upon the failure or refusal of the purchaser to complete said purchase for any
reason other than cancellation on account of increase in price, the cash deposit may
be retained as liquidated damages, and in the event a used car has been taken in
trade, the purchaser hereby authorizes dealer to sell said used car, and the dealer
shall be entitled to reimburse himself out of the proceeds of such sale, for the
expenses specified in paragraph 6 above and also for his expenses and losses
incurred or suffered as the result of purchaser's failure to complete said purchase.
(9) The manufacturer has the right to make any changes in the model or design of
any accessory or part of any new motor vehicle at any time without creating
any obligation on the part of either the Dealer or the Manufacturer to make
corresponding changes in the car covered by this order either before or subsequent
to the delivery of such car to the purchaser.
(10) Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the manufacturer, accidents, strikes,
fires, or other causes beyond the control of the dealer.
(11) The price of the car quoted herein does not include any tax or taxes imposed by
any governmental authority prior to or at the time of delivery of such car unless
expressly so stated, but the purchaser assumes and agrees to pay, unless pro-
hibited by law, any taxes, except income taxes, imposed on or incidental to the
transaction herein, regardless of the person having the primary tax liability.
(12) THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, OF
MERCHANTABILITY, OR OF FITNESS, MADE BY THE SELLER
HEREIN, OR THE MANUFACTURER, ON THE VEHICLE OR CHAS-
SIS DESCRIBED ON THE FACE HEREOF EXCEPT THAT, In The
Case Of A New Vehicle Or Chassis The Printed New Vehicle Warranty
Delivered To Purchaser With Such Vehicle Or Chassis Shall Apply And The
Same Is Hereby Made A Part Hereof As Though Fully Set Forth Herein.
The New Vehicle Warranty Is The Only Warranty Applicable To Such New
Vehicle Or Chassis And Is Expressly In Lieu Of All Other Warranties, Ex-
pressed Or Implied, Including Any Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Or
Fitness For A Particular Purpose. In The Case Of A Used Vehicle Or Chassis,
The Applicability Of An Existing Manufacturer's Warranty Thereon, If Any,
Shall Be Determined Solely By Terms Of Such Warranty.
(13) The Dealer Also Agrees Promptly To Perform And Fulfill All Terms And
Conditions Of The Owner Service Policy.
(14) This order shall not become binding until accepted by dealer or his authorized
representative, and, in the event of a time sale, dealer shall not be obligated to
sell until approval of the terms hereof is given by a bank or finance company
willing to purchase a retail installment contract between the parties hereto based
on such terms.
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(15) In case the car covered by this order is a used car, no warranty or representa-
tion is made as to the extent such car has been used, regardless of the mileage
shown on the speedometer of said used car.
(16) USED CAR WARRANTY: THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES, EX-
PRESSED OR IMPLIED, OF MERCHANTABILITY, OR OF FITNESS,
MADE BY THE SELLER HEREIN, OR THE MANUFACTURER. The
used car described on front is hereby warranted to be in satisfactory operating
condition commensurate with age and condition at this date and to remain in
such condition under normal use and service for a period of one year after delivery.
(17) The undersigned agrees, if said car is delivered during the above period to our
place of business, to make with reasonable promptness any repairs or replacements
which may be necessary to its satisfactory operating condition in accordance with
normal use and service, at a cost to the purchaser named on front at a 25% dis-
count on parts and 25% discount on labor.
(18) This warranty does not extend to any replacements, repairs, or service made
necessary by misuse, negligence, or accident, considering age and condition of car.
All Parts And Labor Under This Warranty Shall Be For Cash Only.
(19) When purchasing a demonstrator it is hereby understood that the price being
paid takes into consideration the fact that the automobile has been driven and
subject to normal wear and use. It is also understood that the purchaser has
inspected the automobile before delivery. It is further understood that any appli-
cable warranty was put into effect on the day the car was first put in demonstrator
service and not the date of the retail sale.
APPENDIX II
A typical retail sales contract used in the purchase of a motor vehicle
would include the following provisions:
RETAIL SALES CONTRACT
AND
TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURE
(Front)
(1) Buyer's Name- -. Address___-_-_-------
(Street No. or P.O. Box)
(City) (County) (State) ("Buyer") purchases from
____ ("Seller")
(Seller's Name and Address)
the following described goods:
Type Model Mfg. Ser. Other descrip-
Year New of No. No. No. or tive MaterialQuan. of or Colla- of (if any) Identifi- (length, width,
tity Model Used teral Cyls. cation No. body style, etc.)
Accessories: C] air conditioning 5 auto. transmission 0 radio
0 power brakes 5 power steering
and the following Extra Equipment
together with all tools, accessories, parts, equipment, and accessions attached
thereto, and, if the goods include a mobile home, all furniture and appliances now
in or hereinafter placed in or on such mobile home, the aggregate of all such 29
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goods, accessories, and Extra Equipment being hereinafter referred to as "Col-
lateral," which will primarily be used for E] personal or family use, [] business
use, or E] farming operations, for a Total of Payments computed as follows:
1. Cash Price - - ---- - - - - - - --
2. Down Payment:
(a) Trade-in (description_ _ $)
(b) Amount of Pay-off, if any - $
(c) Equity (a+b)- ----- $
(d) Cash Down Payment - - - $
3. Total Down Payment (c+d) - - -$
4. Unpaid Balance of Cash Price (No. 1-No. 3) - - - $.
5. Other Charges:
(a) Total Insurance Premiums ------ $ 
(b) Sales Tax ----------- $ 
(c) Excise Tax----------- - $-
(d) Filing Fee ---- $- -- ------
(e) License Fees $-----------
6. Total Other Charges $-----------
7. Unpaid Balance and Amount Financed------ $
8. FINANCE CHARGE (Credit Service Charge) - $
9. Total of Payments (No. 7 + No. 8)- ------ $- _-_-
10. Deferred Payment Price (No. I + No. 6 + No. 8) - $
11. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE - --- -
(2) Buyer agrees to pay to Seller the Total of Payments in installments
of $ each, payable on the day of each month com-
mencing ,19---, with a final payment of $
due and payable on 19 .---. Total number of pay-
ments: - . All installments of the Total Time Selling Price (Total
of Payments) shall be payable at the main banking office of any branch of
The ----......... Bank ("Bank"). Buyer admits that Seller is not the
agent of the Bank for any purpose.
(3) Until such time as the Total Time Selling Price (Total of Payments) is paid
in full by the Buyer, the Seller shall retain title to the Collateral and Seller shall
have a security interest in the Collateral, to secure payment and performance of
all Buyer's obligations set forth on the reverse hereof.
(4) Delinquent Charges: On each installment in default more than 10 days there will
be assessed an amount equal to 5% of each installment or $5.00, whichever is
the lesser amount. Buyer and Seller agree that if any installment is not paid
within 10 days after due date, Seller may unilaterally grant deferral and make
charges provided by law. Buyer agrees to pay any attorneys' fees incurred by
the holder of this contract in its enforcement if referred to an attorney not an
employee of holder. Rebate: A fraction of the FINANCE CHARGE (Credit
Service Charge) of which the numerator is the sum of the periodic balances
scheduled to follow the computational period in which payment occurs and the
denominator is the sum of the periodic balances under the sales agreement. A
minimum charge of $7.50 will be retained.
(5) THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS THE ENTIRE CONTRACT BETWEEN
SELLER AND BUYER, AND NO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANT-
ABILITY OR OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND
NO AGREEMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES OR STATE-
MENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE SELLER,
EXCEPT AS SET FORTH HEREIN OR AS MAY BE SPECIFICALLY
ENDORSED HEREON IN WRITING.
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL TERMS OF CONTRACT.
(6) UNLESS SPECIFICALLY STATED, THE INSURANCE CONTRACTED
FOR IN CONNECTION WITH THIS RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALE
DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR BODILY
INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE. 30
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(7) Buyer acknowledges receipt of this disclosure and that a completely filled in copy
of this Contract, signed by Seller, has been delivered to and retained by Buyer.
(8) "Seller" X "Buyer" X
By
(Reverse)
ADDITIONAL TERMS OF CONTRACT
Buyer warrants and agrees that:
(9-1) Buyer waives, as against any assignee of this Contract, all claims, now or here-
in existing, of Buyer against Seller and agrees not to set up such claims as a defense,
set-off, counterclaim, or otherwise, to any action brought by such assignee for any
amount due hereunder or for possession of the Collateral or any part thereof. Provided,
however, if the transaction underlying this Contract constitutes a Consumer Credit
Sale pursuant to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code such waiver shall not be effective
unless assignee is not related to the Seller; assignee acquires the Contract in good
faith and for value; and assignee gives Buyer notice of the assignment and Buyer
gives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the Buyer's claim or defense to
assignee within 60 days after the mailing of the aforementioned notice.
(9-2) The Collateral will be kept at the address of the Buyer set out in the contract,
which in the case of a business is the address of the principal office of such business
within this state. Buyer will not remove the Collateral from the state without the
prior written consent of the Seller. Buyer will immediately give written notice to the
Seller of any change of address or, in the case of a business, any change in its principal
place of business, and any use of the Collateral in any jurisdiction other than a state in
which the Seller shall have been advised in writing that such Collateral will be used.
(9-3) Buyer will deliver or cause to be delivered to the Seller any certificate or cer-
tificates of title to the Collateral with the security interest of the Seller noted thereon.
In addition, Buyer authorizes the Seller at the expense of the Buyer to execute and
file on its behalf a financing statement or statements in those public offices deemed
necessary by the Seller to perfect its security interest in the Collateral.
(9-4) The Collateral is now and shall continue to be personal property until the total
of payments and any other indebtedness is paid, notwithstanding the manner or degree
of affixation of the Collateral to any real property, and notwithstanding the extent to
which such affixation shall facilitate the use of the real property.
(9-5) Buyer shall keep the Collateral free from any adverse lien, security interest, or
encumbrance, and shall keep such Collateral in good order and repair and will not
waste or destroy such Collateral or any part thereof. Buyer will not use the Collateral
in violation of any statute or ordinance or any policy of insurance thereon and the
Seller may inspect such Collateral wherever located at any reasonable time or times.
Buyer assumes the risk of loss of the Collateral.
(9-6) Buyer will not sell or offer to sell or otherwise transfer this Collateral or any
interest therein without the prior written consent of the Seller.
(9-7) Buyer agrees to keep the Collateral insured, in favor of Seller and at Buyer's
expense, against fire, theft, and other risks, and for such amounts as Seller may
require and with companies acceptable to Seller; and to furnish satisfactory evidence
of such insurance to Seller upon demand. Upon any failure of Buyer to do so, Seller
may, but need not, so insure the Collateral. To the extent expenditures of Seller for
such insurance are not included in Insurance Premium, Buyer agrees to pay to Seller,
upon demand, the amount of such expenditures, together with interest thereon at the
annual percentage rate provided herein, until paid. In the event of default by Buyer
hereunder, Seller may cancel any insurance hereinabove referred to. Buyer hereby
assigns to Seller the right to any moneys which may become payable under or on
account of any such insurance, including returned or unearned premiums, and directs
any insurance company to make payment directly to Seller, to be applied to such of
the indebtedness of Buyer hereunder as, subject to any requirements of applicable law,
Seller may elect, and appoints Seller as Buyer's attorney in fact to endorse drafts.
Buyer authorizes Seller to correct any patent errors in filling in any blanks in
this contract. 31
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(9-8) Buyer will pay promptly when due all taxes and assessments upon the Collateral
or for its use or operation.
(9-9) The occurrence of any one of the following events shall constitute default under
this Contract: (a) nonpayment when due of any installment of the indebtedness
hereby secured or failure to perform any agreement contained herein, (b) any state-
ment, representation, or warranty, at any time furnished the Seller if untrue in any
material respect as of the date made; (c) Buyer's insolvency or inability to pay debts
as they mature or making of an assignment for the benefit of creditors or the institu-
tion of any proceeding by or against the Buyer alleging that such Buyer is insolvent
or unable to pay debts as they mature; (d) entry of a judgment against the Buyer;
(e) loss, theft, substantial damage, destruction, sale, or encumbrance to or of all or
any portion of the Collateral, or the making of any levy, seizure, or attachment
thereof or thereon; (f) death of the Buyer who is a natural person or any partner
of the Buyer which is a partnership; (g) dissolution, merger, or consolidation or
transfer of a substantial portion of the property of the Buyer which is a corporation
or a partnership; or (h) the Seller deems itself insecure for any reason whatsoever.
When a default shall exist, the entire indebtedness of the Buyer and any other liabili-
ties may, at the option of the Seller and without notice or demand, be declared and
thereupon immediately shall become due and payable and the Seller may exercise
from time to time any rights or remedies of a secured party under the Uniform
Commercial Code or any other applicable law. Buyer agrees in the event of default
to make the Collateral available to the Seller at a place acceptable to the Seller which
is convenient to the Buyer. Seller will give Buyer at least ten (10) days prior
written notice of the time and place of any public sale of the Collateral or of the
time after which any private sale or any other intended disposition thereof is to be
made. Expenses of retaking, holding, repairing, preparing for sale, and selling shall
include the Seller's reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. Any proceeds of any
disposition of the Collateral may be applied by the Seller to the payment of expenses
of retaking the Collateral, including reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses,
and any balance of such proceeds may be applied by the Seller toward the payment
of the indebtedness owing from the Buyer to the Seller.
(10) No delay on the part of the Seller in the exercise of any right or remedy shall
operate as a waiver thereof, and no single or partial exercise by the Seller of any
right or remedy shall preclude other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any
other right or remedy. If more than one party shall execute this Contract, the term
"Buyer" shall mean all parties signing this contract and each of them, and all such
parties shall be jointly and severally obligated hereunder. The neuter pronoun, when
used herein, shall include the masculine and the feminine, and also the plural.
(11) This Contract shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of ---- -------- --.- Wherever possible each provision of this Contract shall
be interpreted in such manner as to be effective and valid under applicable law, but if
any provision of this Contract shall be prohibited by or invalid under applicable
law, such provision shall be ineffective only to the extent of such prohibition or in-
validity without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the remaining pro-
visions of this Contract.
This Contract shall be binding upon the heirs, administrators, and executors
of the Buyer, and the rights and privileges of the Seller hereunder shall inure to the
benefit of its successors and assigns.
(12) Guaranty by Third Party
Undersigned, jointly and severally, if more than one, guarantee(s) the
payment when due to any holder of the within contract of all amounts from time to
time owing thereunder and the payment upon demand of the unpaid time balance
owing on said contract in the event of any default by the purchaser named therein.
Undersigned waive(s) notice of acceptance of this Guaranty, notice of any
extensions in time of payment, notice of sale of the property, and all other notices to
which undersigned might otherwise be entitled by law; agree(s) to pay all amounts
owing on said contract, upon demand, without requiring any action or proceeding
against purchaser; and agree that the holder may set off any amounts so owing against
any accounts, including joint accounts, of the undersigned with holder.
Dated --- , 19.
ATTEST: (If required for Corporation authority)
(Authorized Officer) 32
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(13) Assignment
FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, the undersigned hereby sells, assigns, and transfers to THE ....
-..------....-....--- - ---- BANK the within contract, and all right, title, and interest in, to,
and under the same, and in and to the property therein described, with authority to
take, either in its own name or in the name of the undersigned, but for its own benefit,
all such proceedings, legal or equitable, as the undersigned might have taken but for
this assignment
The undersigned hereby warrants that the within contract represents a valid
deferred-payment obligation for the amount therein set forth, of bona fide pur-
chaser(s), as therein described, having legal capacity to enter into the same; that
said contract and all accompanying agreements and other documents are genuine in all
respects and are what they respectively purport to be; that the disclosure statement
pursuant to the Consumer Credit Protection Act is true and correct; that all state-
ments of facts within the knowledge of the undersigned therein contained are true;
that at the time of execution of said contract the undersigned had good title to said
property and the right to transfer -nencumbered title thereto; that the security in-
terest expressed in said contract is a perfected security interest and is a first lien on
the Collateral; and that the undersigned has no knowledge of any facts which impair
the validity of any of said instruments. The undersigned waives all demands and
notices of default and consents that, without notice to the undersigned, the assignee
may extend time to or compound or release, by operation of law or otherwise, any
rights against Buyer or any other obligor.
The assignee shall not be bound to take any steps necessary to preserve any
rights in the within contract or any accompanying agreements or documents against
prior parties, which the undersigned hereby assumes to do.
The undersigned agrees to indemnify the Bank against any and all losses and
expenses it may incur as the result of any defense or claim raised by the Buyer under
this Contract
The undersigned agrees that if any warranty herein contained proves to have
been false when made, or the Bank suffers any loss from a claim raised by the Buyer,
the undersigned will, upon demand of the assignee, at its election, either accept a
reassignment of the contract or repurchase the property, and, in either event, will pay
therefor the amount then due under the contract. The assignee shall have, in addition
to the rights set forth above, all those rights set forth in the most recent agreement
between the undersigned and the assignee, incorporated herein and made a part hereof,
or, in the event the undersigned signs any provision dealing with repurchase, limited
repurchase, partial guaranty, or full guaranty, the assignee shall have the additional
rights of recourse against the undersigned appearing in the provision signed.
-,~19 ..
Signature of Seller
By -- Title-- . --... . .
APPENDIX III
A typical new vehicle warranty would include the following provisions:
NEW VEHICLE WARRANTY
WHAT IS WARRANTED AND FOR HOW LONG
Manufacturer warrants to the owner of each 1974 model motor
vehicle that for a period of 12 months or 12,000 miles, whichever first occurs, it will
repair any defective or malfunctioning part of the vehicle except tires, which are
warranted separately by the tire manufacturer. This warranty covers only repairs
made necessary due to defects in material or workmanship.
The 12-month/12,000-mile warranty period shall begin on the date the vehicle is
delivered to the first retail purchaser or, if the vehicle is first placed in service as a
demonstrator or company vehicle prior to sale at retail, on the date the vehicle is first
placed in such service.
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WHAT IS NOT COVERED BY THE WARRANTY
This warranty does not cover:
1. Conditions resulting from misuse, negligence, alteration, accident, or lack of
performance of required maintenance services;
Z The replacement of maintenance items (such as spark plugs, ignition points,
positive crankcase ventilation valve, filters, brake and clutch linings) made in
connection with normal maintenance services;
3. Loss of time, inconvenience, loss of use of the vehicle or other consequential
damages;
4. Any vehicle on which the odometer mileage has been altered and the vehicle's
actual mileage cannot be readily determined; or
5. Any vehicle registered and normally operated outside the United States or
Canada. The warranty for these vehicles shall be that authorized for the
country in which the vehicle is registered and normally operated.
MANUFACTURER'S OBLIGATIONS
1. Repairs qualifying under this warranty will be performed by any authorized
dealer within a reasonable time following delivery of the vehicle to the dealer's
place of business.
2. Manufacturer will pay the authorized dealer for any repair under the warranty.
OWNER'S OBLIGATIONS
1. The vehicle must be delivered to an authorized dealer's place of business during
regular business hours for performance of warranty repairs.
2. The owner is responsible for maintenance services which may be performed at
the owner's option by any repair outlet regularly performing such services.
This is the only express warranty applicable and Manufacturer neither assumes nor
authorizes anyone to assume for it any other obligation or liability in connection with
such vehicles.
WHAT TO DO IF THERE IS A QUESTION REGARDING WARRANTY
The satisfaction and goodwill of owners of the Manufacturer's products are of
primary concern to it, as well as to its dealers. In the event a warranty matter is
not handled to your satisfaction, the following steps are suggested:
1. Discuss the problem with your dealership's management.
2. Contact the Zone Office closest to you as listed in the Owner's Manual.
3. Contact the Manufacturer's listed Customer Services Manager.
[VOL. 19: p. 555
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